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The starting point of our paper is the distinction between a non-praxical impossibility 
from a praxical impossibility (i.e. an impossibility that does concern praxis, action). Our 
paper will focus on praxical impossibility. Within the domain of praxical impossibility, 
we will distinguish six different forms of praxical impossibility making use of three 
dichotomies: nomophoric vs. non-nomophoric, presence vs. absence, type vs. token. 
The eight forms of impossibility we introduce (non-praxical impossibility, praxical 
impossibility, nomophoric impossibility, non-nomophoric impossibility, presence-
impossibility, absence-impossibility, type-impossibility, token-impossibility) are eight 
ideal types for a philosophy of impossibility.
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We shall explore the phenomenology of impossibility [in german: 
unmöglichkeit; in French: impossibilité; in italian: impossibilità] by applying the 
Platonic method called dihaíresis (in english: division).
With this method we will be able to find or discover four distinct dichotomies 
which allow us to distinguish eight different forms of impossibility.
these eight forms of impossibility are eight ideal types, eight eidotypes [in 
german: eidotypen; in italian: eidótipi] for a philosophy of impossibility.
2.1. First Dichotomy: Praxical Impossibility vs. Non-Praxical 
Impossibility
2.1.1. there is a kind of impossibility that doesn’t concern praxis, action, a 
kind of impossibility which is not a praxical impossibility; in other words, 
there is a non-praxical impossibility.
an example of non-praxical impossibility [Example 1.] occurs in the 
philosopher edmund husserl [Proßnitz, 1859 – Freiburg im Breisgau, 1938] 
(husserl 1900-1901, § 10,  255; english translation, 18):
eine farbe schließt eine andere aus, nämlich an demselben flächenstück, das 
sie beide ganz überdecken sollen, aber es beide eben nicht können.
a colour excludes another colour, but only if both aim to cover an identical 
piece of surface, and both cannot do so completely (husserl 1900-1901, § 10, 255; 
english translation, 18).
2.1.2. the main subject of our paper, however, is a kind of impossibility that 
concerns praxis: praxical impossibility.
this praxical impossibility is exemplified by the following nine sentences:
[Example 2.] impossibility in a chess game of moving right off the 
chessboard1;
[Example 3.] impossibility of castling if the king is under check;
1 “indeed this would not count as a 'move'” (Black 1958, 72).
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[Example 4.] impossibility to ordain a woman priest in the roman 
catholic church;
[Example 5.] impossibility for someone to forgive himself2;
[Example 6.] impossibility of promising feelings3;
[Example 7.] impossibility of castling in draughts/checkers4;
[Example 8.] impossibility of electing the judges of the constitutional 
court according to the Polish constitution of 19525;
[Example 9.] impossibility of revoking a deputy of the Polish 
Parliament according to the Polish constitution of 19526.
Thus we may draw a first dichotomy [dichotomy 1.]:
[DICHOTOMY 1.]
praxical impossibility (impossibility that concerns action) 
vs. 
non-praxical impossibility (impossibility that does not concern 
action).
Second dichotomy: nomophoric impossibility vs. non-nomophoric 
impossibility.
2.2. Second Dichotomy: Nomophoric Impossibility vs. Non-Nomophoric 
Impossibility 
2.2.1. to introduce the second dichotomy let’s compare the following list of 
four examples.
[Example 3.] impossibility of castling if the king is under check;
[Example 4.] impossibility to ordain a woman priest in the roman 
catholic church;
[Example 5.] impossibility for someone to forgive himself;
[Example 6.] impossibility of promising feelings.
2 See (reinach 1913).
3  “Was man versprechen kann. man kann handlungen versprechen, aber keine 
Empfindungen: denn diese sind unwillkürlich” (Nietzsche 1878-1879, § 58). 
4  See (Wittgenstein 1967, § 134, 315).
5  See (Ziembiński 1966b).
6  See (Ziembiński 1968).
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What is the difference between these two pairs of examples?
2.2.2. In the first pair of examples ([Example 3.], [Example 4.]), the 
impossibility is a matter of rules (in particular, the impossibility is due to 
the constitutive rules of chess and, respectively, to the rules of canon law), 
whereas in the second pair of examples ([Example 5.], [Example 6.]), the 
impossibility is not a matter of rules at all.
We shall call the rule-related impossibility “nomophoric impossibility”7.
thus we may draw a second dichotomy [dichotomy 2.]:
[DICHOTOMY 2.]
nomophoric impossibility (or rule-related impossibility) 
vs. 
non-nomophoric impossibility (or rule-unrelated impossibility).
2.2.3. the relationship between the concept of rule and the concept of 
impossibility is new. But the relationship between the concept of rule and the 
concept of possibility is not new at all.
2.2.3.1. the austrian philosopher ludwig Wittgenstein [Wien, 1889 – 
cambridge, 1951] (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 86), explicitly asserts that what the 
king of chess can do is laid down by the rules.
What idea do we have of the king of chess, and what is its relation to the rules 
of chess? […] What the king can do is laid down by the rules. Do these rules 
follow from the idea? […] No. The rules are not something contained in the 
idea and got by analyzing it. They constitute it. […] The rules constitute the 
“freedom” of the pieces (Wittgenstein 1979, 86). 
2.2.3.2. more recently, the thesis according to which rules are condition 
of the possibility of an action has been explicitly affirmed by Amedeo 
giovanni conte [*Pavia, 1934] and by John r. Searle [*denver, 1932].
2.2.3.2.1. First document: amedeo giovanni conte, Saggio sulla completezza 
degli ordinamenti giuridici: 
7  amedeo giovanni conte (conte 2001, 72) has distinguished three forms of nomophoric 
impossibility: 
(i) deontic impossibility; 
(ii) anankastic impossibility; 
(iii) eidetic impossibility.
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in che senso affermo che un ordinamento normativo è trascendentale? in due 
sensi può affermarsi che un ordinamento normativo è trascendentale: e nel 
senso che esso è condizione di pensabilità dell’azione, e nel senso che esso è 
condizione di possibilità dell’azione stessa (Conte 1962, 196).
In which sense do I affirm that a normative order is transcendental? We can 
say that a normative order is transcendental in two senses: a normative order 
is condition of conceivability of an action, and a normative order is condition of 
possibility of the action itself.
2.2.3.2.2. Second document: John r. Searle, Speech acts. an essay in the 
Philosophy of language:
i want to clarify a distinction between two different sort of rules, which i shall 
call regulative and constitutive rules. […]  
We might say that regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently 
existing forms of behavior; for example, many rules of etiquette regulate inter-
personal relationships which exist independently of the rules. But constitutive 
rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behavior. The 
rules of football or chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing football 
or chess, but they create the very possibility of playing such games. […]  
regulative rules regulate a pre-existing activity, an activity whose existence is 
logically independent of the rules. Constitutive rules constitute (and regulate) 
an activity the existence of which is logically dependent on rules (Searle 1969, 
33-34).
2.2.3.2.3. the correlation between the concept of constitutive rule and the 
concept of possibility occurs again in (Searle 1995):
Some rules regulate antecedently existing activities. for example, the rule 
“drive on the right hand side of the road” regulate driving; but driving can 
exist prior to the existence of that rule. however, some rules do not mere 
regulate. They also create the very possibility of certain activities. Thus, the 
rules of chess do not regulate an antecedently existing activity. […] Rather, the 
rules of chess create the very possibility of playing chess (Searle 1995, 27 and 
43-48, Searle 2010,  97-98).
2.3. Third Dichotomy: Presence-Impossibility vs. Absence-Impossibility
2.3.1. let us consider now the two following examples of nomophoric (or rule-
related) impossibility:
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[Example 3.] impossibility of castling if the king is under check;
[Example 7.] impossibility of castling in draughts/checkers8.
these look similar (they are both nomophoric or rule-related impossibilities). 
they are apparently homogeneous. But are they really?
2.3.2. In the first example ([Example 3.] impossibility of castling if the king is 
under check), the impossibility derives from the presence of a certain rule: in 
particular, it derives form the presence of a deontic eidetic-constitutive rule 
that forbids castling if the king is under check.
in the second example ([Example 7.] impossibility of castling in draughts/
checkers), the impossibility derives from the absence of a certain rule: in 
particular, it derives from the absence of an ontic eidetic-constitutive rule, 
that constitutes the praxeme “castling” in draughts9.
We shall call the impossibility deriving from the presence of certain rules: 
“presence-impossibility”.
We shall call the impossibility deriving from the absence of certain rules: 
“absence-impossibility”.
thus we may draw a third dichotomy [dichotomy 3.]:
[DICHOTOMY 3.]
presence-impossibility (due to the presence of certain rules) 
vs.  
absence-impossibility (due to the absence of certain rules).10
2.3.3. the distinction between presence-impossibility and absence-impossibility 
might very well explain a thesis formulated by ludwig Wittgenstein [Wien, 
1889 – cambridge, 1951] (Wittgenstein 1967, § 134, 315):
Statt: ‘kann nicht’, sage: 
8  See (Wittgenstein 1967, § 134, 315).
9  on the concept of eidetic-constitutive rule see (conte 1985).
10  notice that example 7 ([Example 7.] impossibility of castling in draughts/checkers) is a 
counterexample  to the so-called hume’s guillotine according to which a norm(ative statement) 
cannot be derived from a fact(ual statement). in example [7], a Cannot (a normative cannot) is 
derived from an is.
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‘es gibt in diesem Spiel nicht’. 
Statt: ‘man kann nicht im damenspiel nicht rochieren’, sage: 
‘es gibt im damenspiel kein rochieren.’
instead of ‘you cannot’, say: 
‘it doesn’t exist in this game’. 
instead of: ‘you cannot castle in draughts’, say: 
‘in draughts castling doesn’t exist’ (Wittgenstein 1967, § 134, 315)11.
2.4. Fourth Dichotomy: Token-Impossibility vs. Type-Impossibility
2.4.1. example 7. ([Example 7.] impossibility of castling in draughts) recalls 
another famous example of absence-impossibility discussed by legal 
philosophers: the impossibility of electing judges of the constitutional court 
(according to the Polish constitution of 1952), because of the lack of norms, 
within the Polish constitution itself, concerning the practice of electing the 
judges of that particular court.
The problem is described by the Polish legal philosopher Zygmunt Ziembiński 
[1920-1996] (Ziembiński 1966).
according to Ziembiński, there is a gap (a gap of construction, a 
construction-gap) in the Polish constitution of 1952, because while the 
constitution establishes that the judges of the constitutional court may 
be elected, it does not lay down the conditions or procedures according to 
which the judges are to be elected.
therefore, in the Polish legal order (of 1952), the election of the judges of 
the constitutional court is an impossible act because of the lack of norms 
concerning the mode of election. 
Here is Ziembiński’s relevant passage: 
Selon l’article 50 de la Constitution de la république Populaire de Pologne 
du 22.Vii. 1952 les juges sont éligibles: la loi ordinaire déterminera le mode 
d’élection. Mais […] aucune loi concernant l’élection des juges n’a été instituée 
depuis 1952, et les juges sont nommés par le Conseil d’État en application de lois 
instituées antérieurement. la Constitution a ordonné l’élection des juges, mais 
faute de règles d’organisation construisant cet acte, l’élection est impossible. 
elle ne peut pas être organisée d’une façon quelconque, parce qu’elle doit être 
organisée selon les dispositions d’une loi, et cette loi n’existe pas. C’est un 
exemple typique d’une lacune de contruction (Ziembiński 1966b, 41-42).
11  according to conte’s interpretation (conte 2001): “the phrase ‘castling in draughts/
checkers’ is incompatible both with the semantics of the term ‘castling’ (that is determined 
by eidetic-constitutive rules), and with the semantics of the term ‘draughts/checkers’ (that is 
determined by eidetic–constitutive rules)”.
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under chapter 50 of the Constitution of the Popular republic of Poland of 22.Vii. 
1952, the judges are elected. Ordinary law will establish the modes of their 
election. However, […] no law regarding the election of the judges has been passed 
since 1952; consequently, the judges are appointed by the State Council following 
the laws established in the past. The Polish Constitution has decreed the election 
of the judges; yet, because of the lack of norms regulating that act, the election is 
impossible. it cannot be organised differently, for it has to be organised according 
the law, a law which does not exist. This is an example of a construction gap.
Ziembiński distinguishes two kinds of gaps [in German: lücken; in French: 
lacunes, in italian: lacune] in a legal order:
(i) the gap due to the lack of a norm of conduct and a second type of gap;
(ii) the gap due to the lack of a norm of construction [in Polish: norma 
konstrukcyina] (as in the case  
of the election of the judges of the Polish constitutional court). 
[…] dans le domaine des règles d’organisation, le manque d’une certaine règle 
construisant un acte de caractère conventionnel a des conséquences tout à fait 
différentes de celles du manque d’une simple règle de conduite. À défaut d’une 
règle de conduite, un acte est indifférent au point de vue de la loi. À défaut 
d’une règle d’organisation, un acte de caractère conventionnel est impossible 
(Ziembiński 1966b, 42)12.
Within the domain of organisation rules, the lack of a certain construction rule 
for a conventional act produces an entirely different effect from that produced by 
the lack of a simple conduct rule. in the absence of a conduct rule, an act is legally 
indifferent. in the absence of an organisation rule, a conventional act is impossible.
there is a parallelism between Example 7. (impossibility of castling in draughts/
checkers), and Example 8. (impossibility of electing the judges of the Constitutional 
Court according to the Polish Constitution of 1952).
But there is a crucial difference between these two examples of nomophoric 
absence-impossibility.
12  According to Ziembiński (Ziembiński 1968, 132-133) there is another example of 
impossibility due to the absence of a norm of costruction: [example 9.] impossibility of revoking a 
deputy of the Polish Parliament after the promulgation of the Constitution of 1952. Ziembiński says:
“Selon l’article 2 al. 2 de la constitution de la république Populaire de Pologne du 22.vii.1952, 
les députés à la diète (Seym) sont révocables par les électeurs qui les avaient élus au suffrage 
universel. mais aucune loi concernant la révocation de députés à la diète n’a été instituée depuis 
1952, donc la révocation d’une député est, par conséquent, impossible.” on absence-impossibility 
see (Passerini glazel 2003, 202-207).
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2.4.2. let’s look more closely at the two examples (example 7. and example 8.). 
[Example 7.]  impossibility of castling in draughts/checkers (ludwig 
Wittgenstein);
[Example 8.]  impossibility of electing the judges of the constitutional 
court according to the Polish constitution of 1952.
in both examples, the impossibility is a matter of (absence of) constitutive 
rules. But there is a difference.
to understand the crucial difference between these two examples, we may 
apply the fundamental distinction made by the american philosopher 
charles Sanders Peirce [cambridge (massachusetts), 1839 - milford, 1914]: the 
distinction between type and token.13
2.4.2.1. in the game of draughts/checkers, castling is not possibile because 
there is not the type “castling”. 
We shall call this first form of absence-impossibility “type-impossibility”.
2.4.2.2. on the other hand, in the Polish constitutional game, there is, 
according to the constitution of 1952, the type “electing the judges of the 
constitutional court”. But, in the constitution of 1952, there are no rules 
(hypothetical-constitutive rules) that make possible to instantiate a token of 
the type “electing the judges of the constitutional court”.
therefore, we shall call this second form of absence-impossibility “token-
impossibility”. 






[Example 8.] impossibility of electing the judges of the Constitutional Court according to 
the Polish Constitution of 1952 
is an example of token-impossibility.
13  See (Passerini glazel 2003).
14  the paradigm “token-impossibility” and “type-impossibility” has been introduced by Paolo 
di lucia, Token-impossibility vs. Type-impossibility (paper delivered at the Bocconi University of 
milan, 8th march, 2011).
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the example [7]:
[Example 7.] impossibility of castling in draughts/checkers
is an example of type-impossibility.
3.1. List of Our Four Dichotomies [Dichotomy 1.-Dichotomy 4.]
[Dichotomy 1.]  Praxical impossibility vs. non-praxical impossibility
[Dichotomy 1.]  nomophoric impossibility vs. non-nomophoric impossibility
[Dichotomy 3.]  Presence-impossibility vs. absence-impossibility
[Dichotomy 4.]  Token-impossibility vs. type-impossibility.
3.2. List of Our Eight Eidotypes [Eidotype 1.-Eidotype 8.]
through the four dichotomies (first dichotomy: praxical impossibility vs. non 
praxical impossibility; second dichotomy: nomophoric impossibility vs. non-
nomophoric impossibility; third dichotomy: presence-impossibility vs. absence-
impossibility; fourth dichotomy: token-impossibility vs. type-impossibility) 
we have determined eight forms of impossibility.
these eight forms of impossibility are eight ideal types, eight eidotypes 
[in german: idealtypen, or eidotypen; in italian: tipi ideali, or eidótipi] for a 
philosophy of impossibility:
[Eidotype 1.] Praxical impossibility
[Eidotype 2.]  non-praxical impossibility
[Eidotype 3.]  nomophoric impossibility
[Eidotype 4.]  non-nomophoric impossibility
[Eidotype 5.]  Presence-impossibility
[Eidotype 6.]  absence-impossibility
[Eidotype 7.]  Token-impossibility
[Eidotype 8.]  Type-impossibility
3.3. List of Our Nine Examples [Example 1.-Example 9.]
[Example 1.]  impossibility for two colours to cover an identical piece 
of surface completely;
[Example 2.] impossibility in a chess game of moving right off the 
chessboard;
[Example 3.] impossibility of castling if the king is under check;
[Example 4.] impossibility to ordain a woman priest in the roman 
catholic church;
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[Example 6.] impossibility of promising feelings;
[Example 7.] impossibility of castling in draughts;
[Example 8.] impossibility of electing the judges of the constitutional 
court according to the Polish constitution of 1952;
[Example 9.] impossibility of revoking a deputy of the Polish 
Parliament according to the Polish constitution of 1952.
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